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1 1	AUG 2 8 2002
3	Public Disclosure Commission
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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF THURSTON
8	
	EVERGREEN FREEDOM FOUNDATION, ET AL,)
9	Plaintiff,)
10	
11	vs.) No. 02-2-00568-1
	NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,)
12	
13	Defendant.)
14	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
15	MOTION TO DISMISS
16	
	BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 23rd day of
17	August, 2002, the following proceedings were held before the Honorable PAULA CASEY, Judge of the Superior
18	Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County
10	of Thurston.
19	The Plaintiff was represented by its
20	attorney, Steven T. O'Ban;
21	The Defendant was represented by its attorney, John West;
22	accorney, com nose,
	WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were
23	had, to wit: Christy Lynn Sheppard, CCR
	Official Pro Tem Court Reporter
25	(253) 566-1542
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	Page 2
1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	August 23, 2002
3	* * * * * * * *
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5	THE COURT: The first confirmed argument that
6	we will begin with this morning is Evergreen Freedom
7	Foundation versus National Education Association.
8	I think Ms. Strassberg is in a status conference
9	in Judge McPhee's courtroom, so maybe we is she
10	arguing today?
11	MR. WEST: No, I'm arguing, Your Honor, John
12	West.
13	THE COURT: All right. If you will just
14	identify who you are for the record, please.
15	MR. O'BAN: Good morning. My name is Steven
16	O'Ban. I represent the plaintiff, Evergreen Freedom
17	Foundation.
18	MR. WEST: John West, Your Honor,
19	representing the defendant, National Education
20	Association.
21	THE COURT: This comes on for a motion to
22	dismiss, a motion for a stay, a motion for a
23	preliminary injunction, and we will begin with the
24	motion to dismiss.
25	And before doing so, I'm just interested in the

status of the case that was decided by Judge McPhee, in that there is an appellate decision, I know, that is before the Supreme Court on petition for review. And I'm interested in what issues are before the Supreme Court for review.

MR. O'BAN: Your Honor, the petition for review has been filed. We have been told that a decision as to whether the Supreme Court will accept review may take some five months for them to render that decision.

The issues in that case deal with a claim against the Washington Education Association in 1996 who were operating as a political action committee and dealing with issues related to that matter.

THE COURT: And I guess my question is, there was some rulings made with respect to the citizen complaint, and are those issues before the Supreme Court for review or not?

MR. O'BAN: Those may be before the Supreme Court on review.

THE COURT: Well, may be?

MR. O'BAN: Well, the petition itself, with certain base limitations, did not raise the issue of the Supreme Court -- or excuse me, the Court of Appeals decision on the citizen action, and 404 in terms of

- this tolling issue that is obviously at the heart of NEA's motion.
- THE COURT: That was not in the petition for review?
- 5 MR. O'BAN: That was not in the petition.
- THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.
- 7 So I guess this is on NEA's motion to dismiss.
- MR. WEST: Yes, Your Honor. Would you like
 me to speak from here or at the podium?
- THE COURT: Either place, the podium or your table, whichever you prefer.
- MR. WEST: If it's all right with you --
- THE COURT: That's fine.

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14 MR. WEST: Your Honor, as I'm sure you are 15 aware, this is a citizen action that is brought under 16 RCW 42.17.400, which alleges violation by NEA of 17 42.17.760, which is the statute that provides that 18 unions may not use agency fees to make contributions or 19 expenditures to influence an election or to operate a 20 political committee without obtaining affirmative 21 authorization.

Evergreen Freedom Foundation initiated these proceedings with charges that it filed with the Attorney General on the 31st of January of this year.

The Attorney General, a week later, referred those

charges to the Public Disclosure Commission for investigation.

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The Public Disclosure Commission investigated it.

NEA participated fully in that investigation, provided many documents and a lot of information to the PDC.

The Public Disclosure Commission staff prepared a report dated March 27th, some of which we agree with, some of which we disagree with. That report was forwarded by Assistant Director, Susan Harris, to the members of the commission on April the 3rd, and the commission scheduled a meeting to consider the staff's recommendations for April the 9th. On April 8th, the day before, Evergreen Freedom Foundation filed this lawsuit.

And the issue that's presented by our motion to dismiss is, whether a purported citizen action brought under these circumstances is authorized by Section 42.17.400. If not, as we maintain, then the court has no jurisdiction to entertain EFF's claims.

Now, the central issue here as, I think Your Honor is aware from the question you asked initially, is the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of Evergreen Freedom Foundation versus Washington Education Association. That decision was issued ten days or so after Evergreen filed this lawsuit. And

that decision makes clear that under the circumstances that are presented here, a citizen action was not appropriate.

The court says that when the Attorney General refers citizen charges to the PDC for investigation, this action tolls the statutory deadlines that determine when the citizen action may be brought.

And it's clear why this makes sense. The purpose of the citizen suit is to allow citizens to act if the public authorities who have priority in prosecuting these kinds of matters fail to do so.

But here what happened is that Evergreen brought a lawsuit not because the public authorities had failed to act, but to the contrary, they brought the lawsuit to prevent the public authorities from acting.

The reason they did so is that they didn't like the commission staff's recommendations to the Attorney General that the Attorney General be asked to try to settle these charges.

Now, we don't know, for one thing, whether the commission itself would have agreed with the staff's recommendations. But the key thing, whether they would have or not, this is a decision -- how these charges are going to be handled, what kind of prosecution is appropriate, whether it's through initiating a judicial

proceeding, whether it's through an administrative enforcement action brought by the PDC, whether it's through an attempt to reach an amicable settlement, a negotiated settlement -- this is a decision for the public authorities to make.

And the statute doesn't authorize a citizen to bring a citizen's action simply because it disagrees with the prosecutor's judgment about how to handle the case. That kind of action is authorized only if the public authorities fail to act at all.

So the Court of Appeals reading of the statute, as tolling the statute of -- not the statute of limitations, but tolling the deadlines that govern when a citizen action may be brought while the matter is under consideration by the Public Disclosure Commission, is not only what the Court of Appeals says, which in a sense ended this matter, I believe, as far as this court is concerned, but it also is an interpretation of the statute that makes sense.

Now, Evergreen's arguments -- I'm not going to respond to everything that they said. We submitted a reply brief a week ago, Your Honor, which responds in some detail to them. And to the extent necessary, if I have an opportunity for rebuttal after Mr. O'Ban speaks, I will address whatever he may say. I would

just like to make two points here in response to their arguments.

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First of all, as to their reading of the Court of Appeals opinion, Evergreen says that when the Court of Appeals refers to the Attorney General forwarding the allegations to the PDC for investigation, that what it really meant was forwarding the allegations for investigation and the PDC initiating an enforcement action.

Well, no, this is, I argue, a totally implausible reading of the opinion. First of all, it's not what the court says, it's not even close to what the court says. And the court went on in the very next sentence to talk about filing administrative charges. It said, "Further" in introducing that discussion, clearly talking about something additional beyond what it had been talking about in the previous sentence.

And, finally, the court made quite clear in its opinion that filing administrative charges by the Public Disclosure Commission didn't simply toll the statutory deadlines, it extinguished the right to bring a citizen's action, just the same as would be the case if the Attorney General had filed a lawsuit.

So if the court really had, when they said forwarding the matter to the Public Disclosure

Commission for investigation tolls the deadlines, it makes no sense to say that if what you really mean when you say forwarding it to the PDC, is forwarding it to the PDC and the PDC investigating.

If that's what happened, the right to bring a citizen's action is not just tolled, it's extinguished, you know. So it makes no sense to talk about tolling if that's what you had meant.

It's quite clear that the Court of Appeals said two things. It said that when the Attorney General forwards charges to the PDC for investigation that tolls the statutory deadlines. And, then, subsequently, if the PDC acts on those charges by initiating an administrative enforcement proceeding, the right to bring a citizen's action is extinguished.

Evergreen's interpretation would simply read the first part of that out of the Court of Appeals opinion.

THE COURT: And do you read the opinion to mean that if the PDC would have chosen not to bring administrative action, that the citizen action could have proceeded then?

MR. WEST: If they had chosen not to do anything at all.

THE COURT: Well, how about if they had chosen at their meeting not to take administrative

1 action?

MR. WEST: Well, let me just -- I think that the citizen action would not have been precluded if they had chosen what the staff had recommended, which is that the matter be referred back to the Attorney General with the view of attempting to negotiate a settlement. This is still public authorities attempting to resolve this matter through the judicial system. Any kind of settlement would have been a settlement that would have been legally binding on all parties, including possible third parties wanting to act under --

THE COURT: My question is, do you think that that procedure would have precluded a citizen action?

MR. WEST: If they had done that, that would have precluded a citizen action. If they had -- if they had -- in our view, that would have been exactly the same kind of situation as if they had referred the matter to the Attorney General for the filing of a lawsuit.

In either case, the matter is still under consideration by the public authorities, by the Attorney General, and by the Public Disclosure Commission.

Certainly it's clear nobody has even disputed, not

even Evergreen, that if the Attorney General files a lawsuit at the end of this proceeding, then there is no right to a citizen action.

Evergreen agrees that if the Attorney General -if the Public Disclosure Commission initiates an
enforcement action, there is no right to bring a
citizen action either. They don't agree with that as a
matter of statutory interpretation, but they agree that
that's what the Court of Appeals said.

And I think it also follows from this, that if the Public Disclosure Commission refers the matter to the Attorney General with the recommendation that you try to negotiate a settlement, first of all, the Attorney General may or may not have followed that advice. They may have decided, well, we want to file a lawsuit.

But in any event, if there is some judicially cognizable action that is taken by the public authorities, including reaching a negotiated -- a legally binding, negotiated settlement, in our view that would extinguish the right to a citizen action. And while the action that is going to be taken is being considered, the deadlines are tolled.

Judge, have I answered your question?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEST: Your Honor, the only other thing

that I wanted to touch on with regard to Evergreen's arguments is their suggestion that the decision of the Court of Appeals -- they go through a number of arguments, they say plain language of the statute, the purpose of the statute, what the Public Disclosure Commission thinks the statute means, or thought the statute means before this decision came down, all of these really amount to an argument that the Court of Appeals decision was wrongly decided.

And, of course, that's not something that this court has the latitude -- an argument that this court has the latitude to entertain. We explained in our brief why, even if we take these arguments that they make on their own terms, they don't have any merit. And I won't go through those again at this point, but we will leave it at that point unless Your Honor has further questions.

THE COURT: No.

MR. O'BAN: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. O'BAN: The voters, when they first enacted public disclosure legislation back in 1972 or 1974, enacted also 400, sub 4. This is an action right. And clearly the voters felt an important component to a vigorous enforcement of that law was

that a citizen should have the right to bring an enforcement action where government officials either, because they are reticent to enforce the laws for political reasons, or have underfunded the Public Disclosure Commission, fail to bring a lawsuit or vigorously enforce a lawsuit. The citizen right is there as a check against that, and I think we all understand, in some cases, maybe a reticence to aggressively pursue an enforcement action. Such is the case here. And I will talk more about the events of April 8th in just a moment.

But, of course, what's at the heart of this question is: What does 404 mean by "commence an action"? That's the language that the Court of Appeals and EFF versus WEA was construing there in Section C of its opinion. And, of course, it's only Section C of the opinion that the NEA is relying upon for their motion today.

I would like to look at that Section C. I don't know if you have a copy of that in front of you, Your Honor, but --

THE COURT: I have the decision.

MR. O'BAN: Okay. I'm looking at Section C on page -- beginning at 604 of the Washington Appellate Reports. And as with any opinion, it begins -- and I'm

looking at page 604 and 605, with a recitation of the facts which underlie the ultimate holding of the opinion in that section. And those facts, and I will just summarize them, are as follows:

The Court of Appeals felt it was important to mention that; number one, the AG had referred EFF's allegations to the PDC; that the PDC had commenced an enforcement action; that the PDC had -- because it had commenced that enforcement action the AG had decided not to file its own lawsuit, it had deferred to the PDC's enforcement action; and finally, the Court of Appeals cited to the fact that the AG had notified EFF that it could not file suit because the PDC started an enforcement action.

These were, to the Court of Appeals, the essential facts it needed to discuss to support its ultimate holding.

The court goes on to frame the issue. Three paragraphs later it says, under "language of the act," in that section it said, "EFF argues it should be allowed to bring a citizen action because neither the Attorney General or prosecutor commenced an action, rather the Public Disclosure Commission commenced an action against the WEA. And the court goes on to discuss the power of the PDC to commence such actions,

and then to its holding, the section that we are all talking about here today. And in that holding it again cites to two key facts that support its holding, and I'm looking at page -- I guess that would be 606 of the Washington Appellate Reports.

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It says, "Here before the ten-day period had passed after the second letter to the AG, the AG forwarded the allegations to the PDC. This was appropriate action for the AG to take. It tolls the ten-day deadline."

"Further" -- this is the second fact that the court reiterates as necessary to its holding -- "the AG deferred to the charges that the PDC filed as appropriate."

And then the last sentence of the holding, and here's the holding, because of those two essential facts; referral to the PDC by the AG, and because the PDC had commenced an action and the AG was deferring to that action, it says, "Because the AG acted before the end of the ten-day period, EFF could not bring a citizen's lawsuit."

It's saying that this is what extinguishes EFF's right to bring a citizen's action. It is the referral, and it is the fact that the PDC brought an enforcement action. That's where the holding is.

And what the NEA would like the court to do is read out of this opinion, this sentence that begins, "Further, the AG deferred to the charges." And it would like to say that the holding, beginning with, "Because the AG acted," that that follows immediately after the line about referral by the AG, that tolls the ten-day deadline.

The holding begins with that sentence, "Because the AG acted," and it brings into its holding those two key facts.

So our point here, Your Honor, is that necessary to the Court of Appeals holdings were two important elements; one was the referral to the AG; and two was that the PDC had brought an enforcement action that the AG made a decision, a conscious decision, to defer to. And that is specifically mentioned by the Court of Appeals here when it discusses this December 12 letter that the AG sent to EFF.

The AG could have done two things. It could have commenced its own action after that investigation concluded, or it could have deferred to the PDC's enforcement action that had taken place, and that took place before the ten-day period lapsed.

So our point is those two key facts must exist before a court could find that the citizen's action has

been extinguished.

Missing from this case is that second key condition. The Public Disclosure Commission, to this day, and the AG for that matter, has never filed an enforcement action. The investigation -- which counsel for the NEA talks about is important for the PDC to be allowed to do and that's why we have this tolling protection -- that investigation concluded on March 27th, 2002.

The executive director, as we mentioned in our papers, had the authority on her own, apart from the commission, she has the authority under the WAC 39.37.060, we mentioned that in our brief, Your Honor, to commence an enforcement action.

She could have done that on March 27th. She could have done it on March 28th. She could have done it at any time up to the day when EFF commenced its action in this court. She failed to do so.

The PDC had plenty of time to do their investigation. They completed their investigation.

And there was a space of some ten days before EFF filed its action in this court that it could have commenced that enforcement action.

The reason the executive director failed to do so is given by her assistant director in the report which

we have attached to our materials and which the NEA attached to their materials, and that is -- it's actually Exhibit D to Mr. Wilcot's declaration beginning at page 3.

This is the Assistant Director Harris, at the conclusion of the investigation she writes, "If a settlement cannot be reached, staff do not recommend that the AG proceed with litigation, based on current cutbacks and the cost of litigation."

PDC, of course, has to pay for -- or what I should say is, the AG bills the PDC for the litigation cost. So it's important for the staff to be able to say to the AG, if we refer this to you, we don't want you to litigate this, we want you to settle it because we can't afford -- because we are underfunded -- we can't afford to have you commence an enforcement action.

So from the get-go the PDC telegraphed that it had no intention of filing an enforcement action or authorizing the Attorney General to do so.

The point here is that, again, we are now five and a half some months later after the PDC met, and after we filed our lawsuit, and after the Court of Appeals decision was handed down, and to this day the PDC has never brought an enforcement action.

So whether you agree with our analysis, frankly,

or whether you agree with the NEA's analysis there was some sort of tolling period to give the PDC the opportunity to bring some sort of an enforcement action, we are five months down the road and no such action has been --

THE COURT: Tell me again what day the ten-day notice was given.

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MR. O'BAN: The ten-day notice -- well, it was in our materials. I believe it was late February, Your Honor. I'm sorry, I don't have the date in my mind.

THE COURT: Well before April?

MR. O'BAN: Oh, yes, well before April. I will get you that date in just a moment, Your Honor, it's in our materials but it was well before April.

MR. WEST: March 22.

MR. O'BAN: Oh, thank you. March 22.

We discussed the PDC's position on this issue and the AG's position on this issue. We have included letters from the AG and included testimony from the Public Disclosure Commission's executive director about how they understand that the enforcement action has to be commenced within that 45 day or plus ten-day period.

We included all that information not because we want the court to side with the PDC over the Court of

Appeals, but our point is that the NEA has suggested a certain interpretation of the EFF-WEA decision from the Court of Appeals. We think they have got that interpretation wrong. I just told you what we believe the interpretation to be.

And my point is that the PDC and the AG side with our interpretation, and that is that an enforcement action has to be commenced before that ten-day period expires, otherwise the citizen action rights spring forward and the citizen has the right, as it does in this case, to enforce the law.

The failure to, I think, ignore the PDC and the AG and adopt the NEA's interpretation results in a number of really absurd and unintended consequences here. One of which is, we as lawyers, I think, have always understood "commence an action" to be just that, commencing a lawsuit in which the plaintiff is seeking to enforce certain rights or protect certain rights.

Section 410 of the Public Disclosure Commission which sets forth the statute of limitations, of course, uses the same language. You have to commence an action within five years or the lawsuit to enforce the law is time barred.

Well, under the NEA's interpretation here of EFF versus WEA, that means that the referral of an

investigation alone will toll that statute of limitations.

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The statute could not be more clear. It's not any action which extinguishes the right of the citizen action, it's the commencement of an action. The same language that we all understand deals with how we interpret and apply a statute of limitations time bar.

Finally, if we were to accept the NEA's interpretation as I understand it, it means that the ten-day period was tolled on the day that that matter was referred over to the PDC.

Well, how long has it been tolled? We are five months out now. Is it still tolled? At some point surely, the tolling stops when enough time is lapsed and the PDC has not brought enforcement action or the AG has not brought enforcement action, something they certainly could have done if they had adopted the NEA's interpretation of EFF versus WEA.

THE COURT: Can you tell me what the difference is in the ultimate outcome as to whether this action is conducted someplace else or here because any action at the administrative agency was appealable, I assume or not?

MR. O'BAN: I would have to assume that was

THE COURT: Maybe not, because you are not a

2 party to --

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MR. O'BAN: I'm afraid I don't know.

Are you talking about if an administrative action --

THE COURT: Why is this such an important issue to EFF as to whether you are bringing this action or whether it is being brought by the PDC?

MR. O'BAN: Well, I think for one primary reason, Your Honor, is that we believe the Public Disclosure Act should be enforced vigorously, and we are on record as having attempted to do that in other scenarios against the WEA, which has been fined a number of hundreds of thousands of dollars, largely through EFF's efforts.

The point, though, is that when we saw the staff's recommendation to the commission not to litigate this, to settle this at all costs, because of -- and I understood this, because of their budgetary constraints -- and at the same hearing, by the way, they were authorizing the litigation against permanent offense and Mr. Eyman, that was no doubt going to be an expensive proposition for them -- due to budget constraints they did not have the wherewithal to vigorously enforce this law against the NEA.

And so because of that concern we brought this lawsuit. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you the same questions that I asked Mr. West.

So if the PDC had met on April 9th and determined not to proceed with its own enforcement action but to tell the Attorney General to negotiate, do you believe that at that point -- well, what do you believe the situation would have been at that point? That was the decision, not to act, so the citizen complaint would have been permissible?

MR. O'BAN: Well, my point really, Your Honor, is that's precisely what happened. They did meet and they elected not to bring an enforcement action that day.

THE COURT: But wasn't that because you had filed your suit?

MR. O'BAN: Not necessarily. The staff had already said they did not have the financial wherewithal to prosecute this action. For all we know, one of the motivating factors for the commission not to bring an action that day or subsequent to that point after the EFF-WEA decision came down, was that they just don't have the financial ability to bring such a lawsuit against such a big player like the NEA.

My point, Your Honor, is that's precisely what happened. Motivations may be in doubt, but they decided not to bring an enforcement action, not to refer it to the AG. And nothing has changed since then.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to let Mr. West briefly respond.

MR. WEST: I'm going to come up here this time, Your Honor, if you don't mind.

On this last question, what the staff recommended, which the commission may or may not have accepted, was that it be referred back to the Attorney General, and they had a suggestion as to how it ought to be handled by the Attorney General.

It's quite conceivable that the Attorney General would have field a lawsuit in order to have a basis for settling it, put more pressure on us to settle. They may have chosen to try and negotiate a settlement. We don't know how that would have happened.

But in any event, this was one of the means by which the resolution of these charges, with binding effects on all parties, could have been achieved.

Let me come back, if I may, to Mr. O'Ban's discussion of the facts that were before the Court of Appeals.

The facts were different, that's certainly true.

And an enforcement action had been initiated in the case that was before the court, but the court says two things in its opinion. It says, first of all, that the deadlines were tolled by the Attorney General --

THE COURT: Can you just refer me to that provision again, because I read it but I can't seem to find it right now.

MR. WEST: Of the opinion?

THE COURT: Yes, of the opinion. And my numbering, the version I have, is numbered differently than Mr. O'Ban's.

MR. WEST: I'm sorry. I'm actually reading it from my reply brief where I have, I think, the -MR. O'BAN: Do you want to look at this?

MR. O'BAN: It's Section C there, beginning there.

Sure.

THE COURT:

MR. WEST: Okay. The court says, "Here before the ten-day period had passed after EFF's second letter to the AG, the AG forwarded the allegations to the PDC for investigation. This was appropriate action for the AG to take and it tolls the ten-day deadline." That's the critical part as far as this case is concerned, I believe.

"Further," in other words, beyond that action,
"Further, the AG deferred to the charges that the PDC
filed as appropriate under RCW 42.17.401 and 42.17.395.
Because the AG acted before the end of the ten-day
period, EFF could not bring a citizen's lawsuit under
42.17.404 and the trial court properly denied EFF's
motion to amend its pleadings."

We would submit, Your Honor, and I think it is quite clear from this, that the court is saying two things. First of all, it's saying that when the AG referred the matter to the PDC for investigation and consideration, that this tolled the deadlines. And then when the AG -- excuse me, when the Public Disclosure Commission acted by bringing an enforcement action, that the right to bring a citizen's lawsuit was extinguished.

On Mr. O'Ban's reading, what conceivable -- his understanding of this is that because the -- that all the court is saying here is that because that -- you have to have both of these, you have to have both the referral to the PDC, and you have to have the PDC bringing an enforcement action.

And that the only reason that the right -- that there was no right to bring a citizen's action is because both of those things occurred. But on that

reading, what conceivable meaning does the statute about tolling have. If you are saying that you have to have the beginning of enforcement action --

THE COURT: There is not a statute about tolling. Do you mean the language?

MR. WEST: I'm sorry. I apologize. The court's language about tolling. That sentence where it says that this was appropriate action to take and it tolls the ten-day deadline.

On Mr. O'Ban's reading, you have to bring the -to extinguish the right to a citizen's action, you have
to bring the enforcement action within the 45-day
period or the extended ten-day period in order to do
that so there is no question of deadlines being tolled.
The language that says the deadlines are tolled when
it's referred to the PDC for investigation, simply has
no meaning whatever under Evergreen's reading of the
opinion.

So the way I would read this, which I think makes a lot more sense, is there are indeed two things here. There was the forwarding of it to the Public Disclosure Commission for investigation, and there was the initiation of enforcement action. And either of these is sufficient, on the facts of that case, to mean that they couldn't bring their citizen's action.

The first, because the deadlines were tolled while it was under investigation, and the second, because the right to bring a citizen's action was extinguished when enforcement action was begun.

The second holding there, the second part of that holding, doesn't apply in this case, but the first one certainly does. And there is absolutely no conceivable reason for saying that the deadlines were tolled under Mr. O'Ban's understanding of what the court is saying.

THE COURT: I will just have you wrap up.

MR. WEST: Okay. Let me just say one more thing really quickly. As far as when this tolling ends, if the Public Disclosure Commission referred this back to the Attorney General for settlement as the staff had recommended they do, and suppose that no settlement had been reached, and finally the Attorney General simply drops the matter with no action being taken, then they clearly can bring their citizen action. There's been no official action, the tolling ends when the Attorney General -- when the public authorities end their consideration of this matter.

They say that the Public Disclosure Commission still hasn't brought enforcement action after five months, so obviously they are waiting for this court to decide this motion to dismiss.

And we would expect and hope that if Your Honor agrees with us and dismisses the case, that we will be right back where we were on April the 9th, and the Public Disclosure Commission and the Attorney General, the appropriate public authorities, will continue this matter which we hope certainly we can settle with them.

In any event, at the time that they brought this lawsuit on April 8th, clearly the deadlines were tolled and the court has no jurisdiction to consider the matter having been brought at that time without statutory authorization.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me say that as I did my preparation for this argument and ruling today, I have been troubled by the dilemma that I am faced with. The Court of Appeals, in the case of Evergreen Freedom Foundation versus Washington Education Association, has rendered an opinion since the filing of this lawsuit that is argued by defendants to be directly on point and control the outcome of this lawsuit, and is argued by the plaintiffs to have facts different than this case, precluding its applicability here.

And I agree with the plaintiffs to this extent, that the facts of this case are quite different than the WEA case. And I believe that the Court of Appeals

has made an overbroad ruling, but in the language of the opinion by the Court of Appeals, it seems to -- their language seems to apply to the case that's before me today.

The WEA case that the Court of Appeals decided, of course, had a matter that was referred by the Attorney General's office to the Public Disclosure Commission, and an action initiated by the Public Disclosure commission within the ten-day period, which precluded a citizen action and the amendment of the complaint in that matter.

And so I do not argue with the outcome of the Court of Appeals decision, it seems very appropriate that the citizen action was precluded because of both of those actions that were taken by the Public Disclosure Commission after the referral from the Attorney General's office.

In this case we have a matter referred by the Attorney General's office to the Public Disclosure Commission for investigation. And at the end of the ten-day period no further action had been taken, either by the Attorney General's office or the Public Disclosure Commission, no action had been initiated in front of the PDC, and no action had been initiated in court.

So by a general reading of the statute it would seem that this citizen action was appropriate. And I agree with the plaintiffs that I think the PDC and the AG thought the citizen action was probably appropriate.

But after April 8th, when the citizen action was initiated, this Court of Appeals decision came down.

And its language specifically says that, "The referral from the Attorney General's office to the Public Disclosure Commission for investigation tolls the ten-day deadline."

It wasn't necessary for the Court of Appeals to make that finding for the outcome in the WEA case. I am searching for how they have arrived at that conclusion. But I believe, as a superior court in division two, that I must follow their ruling and I believe that was part of their ruling.

And accordingly, I believe that means the citizen action must be determined to be premature in this case, because the Court of Appeals has determined that the simple referral by the Attorney General's office to the Public Disclosure Commission for investigation has tolled the ten-day deadline and it has not extinguished the right of the citizen action, but has simply extended the time for its filing.

So that would seem to me to mean that this case

must be dismissed. I think it's unnecessary to make other gratuitous comments about the nature of this lawsuit, but I'm going to make a couple anyway.

Every single day, individuals who make decisions about whether to file a lawsuit or not file a lawsuit do so on the basis of whether they can afford to do so. So it is not uncommon for us to see that lawsuits are not filed because an individual can't afford to file that lawsuit.

But in this case, a government agency charged with the enforcement of the Public Disclosure law, has a staff recommendation at least, that a lawsuit which would otherwise be appropriate not be pursued because of the cost of litigation. And it is now being argued that their choice to make that decision not to pursue this lawsuit may preclude a citizen action in this case, which is also authorized by law.

And I hope that that outcome is one that is not the ultimate outcome of this case.

MR. O'BAN: Can I ask a clarifying question then? So you -- by saying "premature" you are saying that the action of the citizen's right is tolled, not extinguished?

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. O'BAN: Does the court have any quidance

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1	as to how long a matter is tolled? What is a
2	reasonable time for tolling an action at which time if
3	enforcement action hasn't taken place?
4	THE COURT: Well, I would expect you to be
5	back here immediately unless something happens as a
6	result of this ruling and the matter being referred
7	back to PDC. I mean quickly.
8	MR. O'BAN: So by their next meeting, if they
9	haven't dealt with this issue then we could be back
10	here?
11	THE COURT: I'm not making any ruling with
12	respect to that, but it would be my expectation if they
13	didn't do something at their next meeting that would be
14	some evidence that they are intending to act.
15	MR. O'BAN: Thank you.
16	MR. WEST: Thank you, Your Honor.
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18	(Proceedings concluded.)
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